Operation Ceasefire

A Gang Reduction Initiative

By: Steve Adami
Agenda:

• The Story of Boston
• Boston’s Response
  ➢ NIJ Boston Gun Project ➞ Creation of Ceasefire
  ➢ Components of Ceasefire
  ➢ Community/Problem-Oriented Policing
• Results
• Challenges
• Conclusion

David Kennedy: Director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City.
Gang Violence and Boston

• Crack: Late 80’s

• From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, homicide in Boston increased by 230% among those 24 and under

• 22 victims in 1987 to 74 victims in 1990

• An average of 44 youth homicides per year were committed from 1991-1995
The Boston Gun Project

NIJ sponsored project by researchers at Harvard University.

- Boston Gun Project: Problem-Oriented Policing model – focused heavily on the epidemiology of youth firearms violence

- Interagency working group of academics/practitioners

- Quantitative and Qualitative research to assess the nature of and dynamics driving youth violence

- Developed an intervention designed to have a substantial near-term impact on youth homicide (Immediate Effect)

- Implementing and adapting the intervention

- Evaluating the intervention's impact
Boston Gun Project Working Group

• Began meeting in January 1995

• Completed its initial analysis of the problem and created a sketch of the intervention ("Operation Ceasefire") by Fall 1995

• Implemented the Intervention by early 1996
Components of Ceasefire

1. Academic/Practitioner Working Group
2. Interagency Collaboration
3. Partnership with Ten Point Coalition
4. Community-Policing
5. Call-ins
6. Pulling Levers: Strategic Deterrence
7. Social Services
What is a Call-In

• The CALL-IN (also known as a “notification”) is a communication tool used by law-enforcement to deliver a message to the target group (gangs)
• Held in a place of civic importance
• Mandatory condition of release
• Moderator/Law Enforcement/Community/Social Service Providers/Ex-Gang Members
• Pulling Levers
• Clearly state new rules of engagement (Zero Tolerance)
FREDDIE CARDOZA

PROBLEM: VIOLENT GANG MEMBER

“Given his extensive criminal record, if there was a Federal law against jaywalking we’d indict him for that.”

—Don Stern, US Attorney

SOLUTION: ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL CONVICTION

Arrested with one bullet
Sentence: 19 years, 7 months
No possibility of parole

ADDRESS:

OTISVILLE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE
Maximum Security Facility, New York
GOAL: STOP THE VIOLENCE

INTERVALE POSSE

- THEY WERE WARNED; THEY DIDN’T LISTEN

- INTERAGENCY DRUG OPERATION
  - BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
  - DEA
  - ATF
  - STATE POLICE
  - US ATTORNEY
  - SUFFOLK COUNTY DA
  - PROBATION
  - PAROLE
  - SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE

- AUGUST 29, 1996
  - 15 FEDERAL ARRESTS: DRUGS AND CONSPIRACY
  - 8 STATE ARRESTS

- EACH FEDERAL CHARGE CARRIES AT LEAST A 10 YEAR MANDATORY MINIMUM. SEVERAL POSSE MEMBERS MAY FACE LIFE IN FEDERAL PRISON
  - CONFINED UNTIL TRIAL
  - NO POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE

- THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS: THESE CHARGES MAY BE JUST THE BEGINNING

- THE LESSON: GANG VIOLENCE WILL BE STOPPED
Youth homicide in Boston, 1976-2006

Homicides in Boston decreased between 1996 and 2000 during ‘Ceasefire Intervention.’ Homicides have increased since the program ended.

Victims ages 24 and under

What Happened

1. 2000 received national acclaim (decreased crime by 67%)
2. Youth homicides at 15 in 2000 (80% lower than peak)
3. Key actors transferred: Personnel dependent, not process secure
4. Fracturing in PD/Ten Point Coalition
5. 2000 Launched new initiatives unrelated to gangs
6. Incidents of 2001
7. Events of 2004
9. By 2006 murder rate had reached a 10 year high (75)
Conclusion

- Built Legitimacy
- Procedural Justice/Fairness
- Failed to institutionalize ethos of OC
- Proactive vs. Reactive
Questions?